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The Impact of the Fourteenth Amendment
on the Structure of Metropolitan and
Regional Governments
By JAMES E. HERGET*

A drastic overhaul of our system of local government in metropolitan areas seems inevitable,1 and a number of innovative proposals
have been made.' General regional governments may possibly be created, the special district device may be expanded, state agencies or commissions may take over certain functions, or some other solution may be
found. Whatever machinery is employed, the problem of the constitutional legitimacy of the new structure will arise. The basis for any constitutional objection to a governmental scheme will undoubtedly be the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.' This constitutional protection requires the organizational scheme of local governments to provide every citizen with equal
voting power where local officials are selected through an electoral process.
Historical Patterns of Local Government Organization
The federal constitution of 1789 made no reference to local government. The Bill of Rights approved concurrently therewith was, of
* A.B., 1956; L.L.B., 1961, University of Illinois. Associate Professor of Law,
University of Tulsa, College of Law.
1. See generally U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNM ENTAL RELATIONS, METROPOLITAN AMERICA: CHALLENGE TO FEDERALISM (1966); CoUmci. OF

(1956).
2. E.g., Comus, The Council of Governments Approach to Governmental Frag-

STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE STATES AND THE METROPOLITAN PROBLEM

mentation, 22 VAND. L. REv. 811 (1969); Grant, Metropolitan Problems and Local

Government Structure, 22 VAND. L. REv. 757 (1969); Herget, Local Governmental
Reform and the JurisdictionalProblem, 18 DE PAuL L. REv. 119 (1968); SymposiumRestructuringMetropolitan Area Government, 58 GEo. L.J. 663 (1970).
3. This paper does not consider the problem of one-man, one-vote with respect
to reorganization of local governments. For an excellent discussion of that problem
see Hagman & Disco, One-Man, One-Vote as a Constitutional Imperative for Needed
Reform of Incorporationand Boundary Laws, 2 URBAN LAw. 459 (1970).
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course, a list of limitations upon the national government only.' The
assumption was made, and indeed specifically provided for in the Tenth
Amendment, that governmental functions not specifically delegated to
the national government remained with the states. 5 State constitutions
of the postrevolutionary and early nineteenth century period likewise
made very few references to local government, typically providing for
the establishment of a few county or township officials. As the process
of formal constitutional amendment went forward in the nineteenth
century, a number of states inserted provisions in their written constitutions relating to local government, particularly with respect to powers
of taxation.6 However, as a general rule the structure and function of
local government was left substantially to the discretion of the state legislatures. As a result, state legislation and interpretation of that legislation by the state courts must be examined to find the law and practice
of local government until recent times.
During the early periods of our national development there was a
great volume and variety of legislation passed in all of the states creating
various kinds of local governments. 7 The growth of the "municipal
corporation" directly paralleled the growth of the business corporation; however, in the early part of the nineteenth century the distinction
between public corporations and private corporations was indeed a
fuzzy one. By the time of the civil war this distinction had become
firmly established, and from about 1860 onward the law of business
corporations and the law of municipal corporations diverged.
The types of organizations carrying on public functions tended to
crystalize into three categories. First, there were counties, recognized
essentially as administrative subdivisions of the state but nevertheless
usually given corporate status and usually having locally elected officials.
Second, there was the New England town and its progeny the civil township of the western states which also had elected officials. Finally,
4.

1954).
5.
6.

E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 186 (11th ed.

U.S. CONST. amend X.
E.g., CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 18 (debt limit); Wis. CONST. art. 4, §§ 31, 32

(prohibition against special legislation); Wyo. CONST. art. 15, § 6 (tax rate limitation).
7. For a good brief summary see S. SATO & A. VAN ALSTYNE, STATE AND
LocAL GOVERNMENT LAW 1-15 (1970).
8. "A municipal corporation . . . is the body politic and corporate constituted
by the incorporation of the inhabitants of a city or town for the purposes of local
government thereof." 1 J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 19, at 58 (5th ed. 1911) [hereinafter cited as DILLON].
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there was the city or "town" charged with the government of
banized area. City charters and general enabling legislation
greatly with respect to the constitution of the governing body
government; however, the most typical arrangement was to have
ularly elected mayor and city council.'

an urvaried
of city
a pop-

Although these three traditional forms of local government were
the most typical, the most numerous, and perhaps the most important
in our first 150 years, they were certainly not the only forms of local
governing bodies in the United States.
By 1860, the school district had become well established in all
states except the South and was the primary vehicle for carrying forward the program of public education in the United States. It was also
in many respects the most democratic and the most local of all institutions of local government. Other types of special districts and authorities also came into being in the nineteenth century such as drainage districts, park districts, sanitary districts and others. 10 In some of these
organizations the decision-making body which governed the enterprise
was appointed by some public official. 1 In other cases the governing
body was popularly elected either by the general electorate or by a
limited electorate. 1 2 Often the formation of a particular local government authorized by general enabling legislation was conditioned upon
the favorable passage of a referendum, another institution which
achieved popularity in the nineteenth century.'"
In addition to the foregoing types of independent municipal corporations, there were also numerous subordinate boards or commissions
independently elected or appointed to carry out particular functions of
the parent municipal corporation. Most typical was the board of police
commissioners appointed in many cities ostensibly to remove the police
department from the influence of corrupting politics. The separate
9. F. GoODNOW, CITY GovE m
INm = UNrrE
STATES 137-56, 176-83
(1904).
10. E.g., [1869] Ind. Laws 82 (drainage associations); [1889] Ill. Laws 125
(sanitary districts); [1893] Ill. Laws 153 (park district); 1 ch. 401 [1891] Wis. Laws
535 (drainage districts) (declared unconstitutional, In re Theresa Drainage Dist, 90
Wis. 301, 63 N.W. 288 (1895)).
11. E.g., ch. 165 § 3 [1913] Ind. Laws 434 (repealed ch. 231, § 55 [1967] Ind.
Laws) where levee district commissioners were appointed by two judges and one
clerk.
12. E.g., § 9 [1859] Ill. Laws 104, where vote is limited to landowners in the
district according to amount of land owned.
13. E.g., § 1 [1889] Ill. Laws 125.
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board or commission principle, however, was extended to many functions besides the police.' 4
State legislatures also created a number of other kinds of institutions which performed functions for the state at large but were geographically localized and administratively independent. This would
include such state institutions as universities, insane asylums, hospitals,
and state parks. These institutions were viewed as agencies of the state
government responsive to the needs of the state as a whole; hence, the
governing bodies of such institutions were usually appointed by state officials. 5
With respect to the selection of the decision-making body governing each of the various types of local or state governmental bodies
mentioned above, two political movements have had a marked effect.
The first of these is generally known as Jacksonian Democracy.' 6 Its
rise coincided with the election of General Andrew Jackson to the Presidency in 1828, and it exhibited continued vitality past the mid-century
mark. As a political attitude Jacksonian Democracy was characterized
by a firm belief in the equality of all individuals in both their right to
vote for public officials and in their capacity to hold public office. At
the local government level this led to an extension of the franchise to all
adult male voters and eventually to women voters and to the provision
for popular election of a multitude of local functionaries.
As this democratizing process reached its fullest extent, a second
important political phenomenon began to affect the structure of local
government. This was the movement for "good government" which
began in the post-Civil War period.' 7 It was essentially a reaction to
the corruption in city government, to the spoils system, and to the role
played by national political parties in local elections. Its important
effects upon the structure of local government were to separate "politics"
from administration in local government, to introduce the secret ballot
and the short ballot, to provide for appointment of public officials
where technical competence was considered important, and to use the
nonpartisan election as a means of selecting local officials. This movement perhaps reached its greatest influence in the 1920's. 18
14.

For a discussion of the workings of the board system see GOODNOW, sUpra

note 9, at 62.
15.
16.
17.

E.g., CAL. HARB. & NAY. CODE § 1200 (West Supp. 1971).
See generally A. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF JACKSON (1945).
See generally F. STEWART, A HALF CENTURY OF MUNICIPAL

(1950).
18.

ld. at 50.

REFORM
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The federal government has also played a key, if unobtrusive, role
in stimulating the creation of a variety of local government structures.
This has come about primarily through the grant of public lands or public funds to states and local governments for special purposes. It began with the grant of "school lands" in the Northwest Ordinance of
17851" which stimulated the development of school districts in the west.

It continued with the grant of swamp lands in an act in 185020 which
stimulated development of drainage and levee associations and districts.
The federal government was also instrumental in stimulating the formation of both private and public corporations through the grant of lands
for canal, railroad, and higher education enterprises in the nineteenth
century,2 ' and in the 1930's it stimulated the formation of soil and water conservation districts and housing authorities through provisions for
2A
federal funding.
Thus, in the first half of the twentieth century there existed a gov-

ernmental environment in which there were operating numerous public
bodies-both statewide and local, some independent, some semi-in-

dependent of a parent government-with a multitude of provisions for
selecting the governing board of each particular public enterprise.
Among some of the institutions which have especially interesting methods of selection are the Port of New York Authority, 23 the Chicago
Transit Authority, 24 the Association of Bay Area Governments,25 and
26
the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle.
19. Continental Cong. Ordinance of Apr. 12, 1785, 28 J. CoNTINENTAL CONG.
251, 254-55 (1933).
20. Act of Sept. 28, 1850, ch. 84, § 3, 9 Stat. 519 (codified in part at 43 U.S.C.
§ 983 (1970) ).
21. See generally B. HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF PuBLIc LAND PoLicms (1939).
22. See 12 U.S.C. § 1702 (1970) (originally enacted as National Housing Act
of 1934, ch. 847, § 1, 48 Stat. 1246); 16 U.S.C. § 590a (1970) (originally enacted as
Act of Apr. 27, 1935, ch. 85, § 1, 49 Stat. 163); Act of Aug. 28, 1937, ch. 870,
§ 1, 50 Stat. 869, repealed by Act of Aug. 8, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-128, § 341(a),
73 Stat. 318.
23. The board consists of twelve members, six appointed by the Governor of
New York and six by the Governor of New Jersey. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 32.2-3 (1963);
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 6405 (1961).
24. Three board members are appointed by the Governor and four by the Mayor
of Chicago. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2%, § 320 (1969).
25. Board members are elected officials from each city and county in the San
Francisco Bay region with some allowance for population discrepancies. See Jones,
Metropolitan Detente: Is it Politically and Constitutionally Possible?, 36 GEO. WASH.
L. R-v. 741, 752-54 (1968).
26.

WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 35.58.120 (Supp. 1970).

This provides for a
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The Place of Local Government in the
Constitutional Structure
Political Theory
Having examined the historical development of local government
organization, it is now appropriate to examine the political theory which
seems to underly decision-making on this subject. This sojourn into
the nebulous wonderland of theory is necessary to gain perspective on
what the court has done, has not done, might have done, and might do
in the future.
In the United States there have been two widely accepted, if seldom articulated, political theories; they have been appropriately designated as the Madisonian and the Populistic views.17 The Madisonian
view starts from a negative standpoint by rejecting "tyranny," a concept associated with the idea of absolute power concentrated in a ruler
or ruling body. The assumption is made that without some sort of external legal check or restraint such governmental power will be used to
deprive individuals of their natural rights.2 8 The way to avoid this deprivation of individual natural rights is twofold: (1) place the policymaking or legislative function of government in an elective body, the
members of which are chosen by the people in such a way that each
individual has equivalent influence, i.e., an equal vote; (2) divide the
governmental power by function into a nonhierarchical structure so that
concentration is avoided, and the power of each arm of government is
limited by the others and by specific prohibitions and limitations built
into the system. The first device is known as the republican principle,
the second as the principle of checks and balances. Madison himself
was not, of course, a true democrat in the modern sense inasmuch as he
favored exclusion from the elective franchise of women, slaves, nonproperty owners, nontaxpayers, children and perhaps the uneduccated. 29 The important feature of the Madisonian view is that it is a
compromise between two inconsistent propositions. Thus, the republican principle assumes that the best or right governmental policy is devery complicated formula involving local officials of counties and cities with some

attempt to account for population.
27.
THEORY

A summary of these views is found in R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC

(1957) [hereinafter cited as

DAHL].

28. Without getting into a discussion of natural rights philosophy, it is sufficient
for the purposes of this article to equate a natural right with a type of behavior the
interference with which would be deeply resented by the bulk of the community.
29. R. DIXON, DEMOCRATiC REPRESENTATION 38-42 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
DIXON].
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termined procedurally by counting the votes of the people's representatives, i.e., by definition, what is in the public interest is what the majority says.3 0 In contrast, the principle of checks and balances assumes that there are absolute values which must be preserved regardless of majority opinion, and therefore majority opinion itself must be
limited by governmental machinery. 31 This political theory was, of
course, largely written into the federal constitution of 1789.2
The Populistic view, associated with Jacksonian Democracy and
later the Populist movement, is in fact an extension and elaboration of
Madison's republican principle and a rejection of the principle of checks
and balances.3 3 Put most crudely, it is the assertion that in government
majority rule is always right. The difficulty with this view is that it is
either a tautology, in which case meaningless, or it implies both unstated values and unstated conclusions drawn from empirical observation about the workings of governments. Therefore, from the rational
standpoint of the political theorist, it is no more satisfactory than the
logically contradictory Madisonian view.3 4
But one must not be overly bothered by rationality and logic because inconsistency has never proved fatal to political and social development. The two ideologies briefly summarized above have been
held in varying forms throughout our country's history by politicians,
academicians, lawyers, and supreme court justices. The point has often
been made that the theme of majority rule versus minority rights has
been the one most central to our political life.
However, the objection can be made that the law, including constitutional law, does demand consistency and in fact moves toward ii.
Certainly this is true to some degree. However, legal doctrine operates
at a less abstract level than political theory. The Supreme Court must
deal first with the written constitution, not the rationale of the federalist
papers. Likewise, courts must decide concrete cases which do not fit
into neat academic categories. Therefore, while constitutional doctrine
is strongly influenced and shaped by political theory, it nevertheless
moves cautiously within a more restricted sphere, and it seeks logical
consistency only at its own level.3 5
30.
31.

Id. at 41-45.
Id. at 38-45.

32. E. CORWIN, THE PROr.ES OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY BETWEEN THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE MEETING OF THE PHILADELPIIA CONVENTION,
i

1-24 (1964).
supra note 27 at 30-32, 50-60.

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

33.

See

DAHL,

34. Id.

35. See L. FULLER,

THE MORALITY OF LAW

65-70 (2d ed. 1969).
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A third political attitude should be mentioned without raising it to
the level of a theory. This may be called Pluralism.36 Its historical
pedigree may perhaps be traced back to the early nineteenth century,
but it is primarily modem political writers who seem to advance the
idea. It appears to be based upon a sophisticated model of the policymaking process in society as one in which bargaining and compromise
among diverse groups are the means by which decisions are arrived at.
Thus, legislation becomes a process in which majorities form and dissolve as different issues are placed before the legislative body. The
likelihood of success for any particular policy depends upon the capacity to have it presented as a real alternative and the intensity with which
the proponents advocate it as well as the number of constituents or legislators who favor it. This view is not opposed to the Madisonian or
37
Populistic views but can be regarded as supplementary to either.
What is emphasized is the desirability for all interest groups to have
access to the policy-making process and to allow for the varying intensity in attitude by specific groups toward particular issues. Practical
governmental machinery devised to achieve these ends would include
fractional voting, cumulative voting, and appointment according to
a formula.
Attention is now directed to the way in which the accepted political theories-Madisonian, Populistic, and Pluralistic-are applied to the
specific question of subordinate government organization in our constitutional framework. The term subordinate is used here to refer to
those governmental instrumentalities which are created by and receive
their powers from a higher organ of government, usually the legislature,
either state or national. This includes what are conventionally designated as administrative agencies as well as local governments and some
other institutions which do not fit either classification very well. 3 s They
are subordinate governments rather than integral parts of the national
or state government inasmuch as they are not controlled hierarchically
by higher authority and they exercise independent discretion.
Although such subordinate governments are given no attention in
the written federal constitution39 and very little attention in state constitutions,4 ° they have nevertheless been with us from the beginnings of
36.
37.
38.

See DIXON, supra note 29, at 51-53. See also DAHL, supra note 27, at 63-90.
See DIXON, supra note 29, at 51-53.
These are exemplified by state universities, the Tennessee Valley Authority,

the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and integrated (mandatory membership)
state bar associations.
39.
40.

See text accompanying note 4 supra.
Id.
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our government.4 1 From a practical and functional point of view the
necessity for such institutions is obvious. Certain matters of governmental concern require continuous planning, evaluation, supervision,
and administration which cannot feasibly be carried on by the primary
policy-making organ-the legislature. Thus, the Civil Aeronautics
42
Board "governs" the matter of air transportation in the United States,
the town trustees of West Burg "govern" the matters of police, fire protection, streets and water supply for the people in the geographic area
of West Burg, and Central State University "governs" the conduct of
higher education for its students and faculty. In each case there is a
delegation of governmental power, authority, and obligation to a subordinate government. Subordinate governments are a necessity in any
complex society.
It may be argued that such delegation could at least theoretically
be done hierarchically within one monolithic executive department. If
mere "administration' were all that was involved this might be true.
However, in the case of subordinate governments wide areas of discretion are always deliberately left to the subordinate officials whether they
involve adjudication of particular disputes or policy-making or (as is
usual) both. The reasons why a parent government must allow this discretion are its lack of knowledge or expertise, its lack of infallible foresight to see new issues and problems, its lack of time to devote to the
48
subject concerned, or any combination or variation of these factors.
This delegation of discretion by a parent government to a subordinate government appears to violate Madison's republican principle
which is, for practical purposes, equivalent to the Populistic requirement of majority rule." Broadly put, the argument runs as follows. By
constitutional mandate at both the state and national level the people
have placed the policy-making function of government in the hands of a
legislature composed of popularly elected representatives who operate
by majority rule. By giving discretion to a subordinate government
the decision-making power is yielded to a nonrepresentative person or
body which may act arbitrarily and whose decisions may not reflect majority or minority views and may invade the "natural rights" of individuals. This problem has been most often discussed under the label
41. See 1 K. DAVIS, Ai)MImSTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.04 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as DAvis].
42. See Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1324 (1970).
43. For an excellent discussion of the role of discretion in subordinate governments with emphasis on adjudication see K. DAvis, DIScREnTIoNARY JUSTICE (1969).
44. See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
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of "illegal delegation of legislative power."4 It is a real constitutional
problem at the state level in many jurisdictions.4 6 However, it appears
that it is no longer a live issue at the federal level, the Supreme Court
having acquiesced in all such recent congressional delegations. 7
Two different rationales have been employed by the courts to resolve the delegation problem.4 8 First, the latitude of discretion left to
the subordinate government may be so circumscribed as to be no
longer regarded as "legislative" power. This limitation of discretion
may be accomplished in a variety of ways. The particular purpose or
mission of the subordinate government itself severely limits the decisionmaking to matters relating to that mission. In addition, general standards, announced principles, and hard and fast rules may further hem in
the area of discretion. A requirement of openness in decision-making
or that decisions must be rationally justified also tends to reduce the
possibility of arbitrariness. Finally, review of decisions administratively
and ultimately judicially serves as a check upon unfettered discretion.4 9
It will be seen that this approach-narrowly channeling the legislative
power of the subordinate government-has been followed in the field
of administrative law, and the courts have upheld properly channelled
delegations."
The second way of resolving the delegation problem has been to
allow those persons affected by the decisions of the subordinate government to choose their own decision-makers by majoritarian process. 51
Thus, the republican principle of equal representation which would otherwise be defeated by a delegation of power is instead preserved by the
creation of a miniature republic. This rationalization of the delegation problem has, of course, been followed in the field of municipal corporations,5 2 and some state constitutions expressly authorize legislative
45.

See DAVIS, supra note 41, § 2.01-2.16.

46.

E.g., Madison Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. Stein, 47 Wis. 2d 349, 177

N.W.2d 131 (1970) (curative act purporting to validate previous invalid districts upheld); Fond du Lac Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. Miller, 42 Wis. 2d 323, 166
N.W.2d 225 (1969) (statutes authorizing court to set up sewerage district constituted

an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the judiciary).
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

DAVIS,supra note 41, § 2.01.
Id. § 2.01-.16.
K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, 151-61 (1969).
DAVIS, supra note 41, § 2.03 and cases cited therein.
See T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL

LIMITATIONS

REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION

(5th ed. 1883).
52.

Id.

WHICH

228-29
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power for local governments through home rule53 or other provisions."
In other states the delegation has been approved by judicial decisions
on the same theoretical basis.55 The minature republic concept was
carried so far around the turn of the century that some writers urged
an inherent right to self-govermnent, 50 an idea soon discredited.Y5
In
fact, local governments, including such miniature republics as home
rule cities, exercise very limited legislative power because they, too, are
checked by state-imposed standards, principles, rules, purse strings, and
58
ultimate judicial review of their decisions.
In considering the legitimacy of subordinate government structure
in constitutional theory we must make passing reference to the separation of powers doctrine. The fact of the matter is that subordinate
governments have always exercised various combinations of "legislative," "judicial," and "executive" powers, and most courts-including
the federal courts-have reached the conclusion that separation of powers is not applicable to subordinate governments. 59 There is no question that this doctrine, derived from the Madisonian principle of
checks and balances, has some validity at the state and national level,
although it has not worked out the way Madison had contemplated.
The significance of the doctrine to subordinate government is not that
such governments themselves must be fragmented into the customary
tripartite divisions, but that their decisions are to some degree reviewable by the courts and those decisions can generally be modified or reversed by the parent legislature.60
The thrust of the foregoing discussion is aimed at highlighting the
factors which make subordinate governments legitimate in constitutional
doctrine. Another way of putting it is to say that a subordinate gov53.

E.g., Omo CoNsr. art. XVIII, § 3.
CONST. § 65.
55. See LaRoque v. Board of County Comm'rs, 233 Md. 329, 196 A.2d 902
(1964).
56. E.g., Eaton, The Right to Local Self-Government I-V, 13 I-v.
L. REv. 441,
570, 638 (1900) and 14 HAIv. L. REv. 20, 116 (1900).
57. See McBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local Self-Government
1: The Extent of Its Application by American Courts, 16 COLUm. L. Rx v. 190 (1916)
and The Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local Self-Government 1I: An Analysis of
the Legal Principlesand HistoricalFactsInvolved, 16 COLuM. L. REv. 299 (1916).
58. See Cohn, Municipal Revenue Powers in the Context of Constitutional
Home Rule, 51 Nw. U.L. Rav. 27 (1956). See generally Peppin, Municipal Home
Rule in California I-IV, 30 CALIF. L. Rav. 1, 272 (1941), 32 CALIF. L. REV. 341
(1941) and 34 CALIF. L. REV. 644 (1946).
59. See DAvis, supranote 41, § 1.09.
60. Id.

54. VA.
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ernment is "Republican" in the sense of the guaranty clause of the federal constitution 6 ' if the delegation problem is adequately resolved in
one of the two ways described above, i.e. discretion in decision-making
is narrowly channeled or the decision-making body is selected by those
who are affected through majoritarian process.
The Development of a Legal Doctrine
The legal doctrine which established the position of local governments in the constitutional structure was initially worked out by state
courts in dealing with enabling legislation which was challenged on
state constitutional grounds late in the nineteenth century. A coherent
legal doctrine regarding the status of the local government was first
elaborated by Judge Cooley in a chapter of his landmark work, Constitutional Limitations,6 2 first published in 1868. Cooley's work was
almost immediately followed by Judge John F. Dillon's Municipal Corporations3 which went through numerous editions around the turn of
the century. Dillon himself became acknowledged as the ultimate text
authority on the law of "municipal corporations." As already noted,
there were no federal constitutional provisions relating directly to local
government,64 and there were few state constitutional provisions directly dealing with the subject. Therefore, in 1890 Dillon could say
that the legislatures of the states had a free hand in creating forms of local government, although
[t]he supremacy of the legislative authority over municipal corporations is not, however, in all respects, unlimited; but the limitations
must be sought either in the national or State Constitution; and
except as there found, in terms or by fair implication, they do not
exist.63
The limitations referred to were the state and federal constitutional provisions which dealt with the power to tax, the power of eminent domain,
the power to borrow money, the power to engage in activities for a
public purpose, due process of law, and illegal delegation of legislative
authority.66 Although in some instances state constitutions required
that certain local officials be elected,67 there was no general require61.

U.S.

CONST.

notes 124-27 infra.
62. T. COOLEY,
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

art. IV, § 4.

This provision is discussed at text accompanying

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

(1868).

J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1872).
See text accompanying notes 4-6 supra.
DILLON, supra note 8, § 108.
See generally id. §§ 90-132.
E.g., MICH. CONsT. art. XI, § 1 (1850).
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ment to this effect. Therefore, any limitation upon the way in which
the governing board of a local government was selected would have to
be derived from some other constitutional provision. Occasionally, the
organizational structure of some local government was struck down as
being violative of one of the particular constitutional provisions referred
to above, 8 but the general rule became well established that there was
no limitation on the method which the legislature might authorize for
selecting the governing body of a local government. 9
Although the federal constitution of 1789 contained no provisions
7
relating to local government, " it did contain article IV, section 4,71
in which the federal government "guaranteed" to each state a "Republican form of Government." The construction of this guaranty clause
was first undertaken by the Supreme Court in 184972 following the socalled Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island.7 3 The Court was asked indirectly to rule upon the validity of two state governments, each claiming
to be the legitimate one. It was held that only Congress could implement
the guaranty clause, and that this was not a proper decision for the
court to make in the absence of congressional action.7 4 Thus began
the "political question"' or "nonjusticiability" doctrine which has been
maintained by the Court in many decisions down to and including
Baker v. Carr,7 5 decided in 1962.
With the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 came
broad and sweeping language resembling the Aristotelian definition of
justice as the equal treatment of equals:7" "No State. . .shall deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.
Such an abstract ideal would need considerable judicial imple...
mentation to have any concrete meaning, and the Supreme Court proved
quite capable of supplying that meaning in the years to come.
The applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to the structure
of local government was considered as early as 1884 in Hagar v.Rec68. E.g., People ex rel. McCogg v. Mayor of Chicago, 51 Ill.17 (1869); Speed
& Worthington v. Crawford, 3 Met. 207, 60 Ky. 185 (1860).
69. 2 E. McQUILUN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 4.121, at 201 (3d rev. ed.

1966).
70. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
71.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.

72. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
73. See generally A. MowRY, THE DoRR WAR (1901).
74. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
75. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
76. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Book V, in THE GREAT Lor.L PHmosoPHRms
16 (C. Morris ed. 1959).
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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lamation District" in which the Court echoed prevailing state doctrine,
saying in dictum that local governmental power "may be lodged in any
board or tribunal which the legislature may designate." 79
This approach, however, has left the Court's position ambiguous
in later cases.80 In some opinions it has suggested that the organization of local governments presents no federal question whatsoever for
the court to consider. 1 In other opinons the Court has suggested that
a Fourteenth Amendment challenge is only another way of stating the
guaranty clause argument and is therefore nonjusticiable 2
A landmark decision which for a long time was regarded as the
last word on the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to local
government was Hunter v. Pittsburg.8 3 Although the organization and
method of selecting the governing board of a local government was not
at issue, problems of representation were presented. The Court upheld
a city merger statute which provided for a pure majoritarian method of
merger. More important historically than the specific issue, however,
was the sweeping dictum in the opinion which stated:
The State . . .at its pleasure may modify or withdraw all such
powers, may take without compensation such [municipal] property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract
the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another
municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All
this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with 8or4 without
the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest.
This doctrine was followed, or at least given lip service with very
few exceptions, until 1960 when the Supreme Court decided Gomillion
v. Lightfoot."5 That decision struck down Alabama legislation which
attempted to gerrymander the city boundaries of Tuskeegee so that
practically all Negroes were excluded from the city. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority, relied on the Fifteenth Amendment as
the basis of the invalidation. Mr. Justice Whittaker, while concurring
in the majority opinion, thought that the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment provided a much better justification for the
78. 111 U.S.701 (1884).

79.
80.
(1930);
Kiernan
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 705.
See Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74
Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). See also
v.Portland, 223 U.S. 151 (1912).
E.g., Houck v. Little River Drainage Dist., 239 U.S. 254 (1915).
See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 148-49 (1912).
207 U.S. 161 (1907).
Id. at 178-79.
364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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decision.86 This rationale was preferred in a later case which struck
down a city charter amendment that racially discriminated against Negroes, the Court explicitly shifting its grounds to the Fourteenth Amendment.

87

The Supreme Court's decision in Gomillion foreshadowed the
Court's decision in Baker v. Carr"8 which held that the apportionment of
a state legislature was a justiciable question under the equal protection
clause.8 9 The first cases following Baker dealing with local government were Sailors v. Kent Board of Education9" and Dusch v. Davis,9
both decided in 1967. In Sailors the Court upheld a Michigan scheme
in which the county board of education was selected by delegates from
each school district in the county. Since the school districts themselves had differing populations, the county board was not constituted
on a one-man, one-vote basis. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court,
characterized this system of selection as essentially "appointive" rather
than elective and stressed that the duties of the county board were primarily administrative and not "legislative in the classical sense." 92
In Dusch the Court sustained a governmental consolidation scheme
in Virginia in which the new eleven man council was to be elected at
large, but seven of the councilmen were required to reside in the old districts-which, as might be expected, had quite disproportionate populations. Justice Douglas stressed the need for innovation and experiment in local government structure and recognized the role of political
compromise in metropolitan consolidation. Thus, while it was clear
that the one-man, one-vote principle was considered applicable to local
government by the Court, a great degree of leeway would probably be
permitted to take into account diverse interests and factors.
The one-man, one-vote principle was finally held to require the
reapportionment of a Texas county commissioner's court in Avery v.
Midland County,93 a 1968 case. Two important arguments were advanced to justify voting districts for county commissioners which were
apportioned so that one district contained 95 percent of the population.
First, it was contended by the defendant that the county commissioner's
86.

Id. at 349. See also DixoN, supra note 29, at 117.

87.

Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).

88. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
89. For a highly informative discussion of the reapportionment cases down to
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), see DIxoN, supra note 29.
90. 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
91. Id. at 112.
92. Id. at 110.
93. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
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court was not really a "legislative" body in the sense that the term was
used in Sailors, and therefore there was no one-man, one-vote requirement. The second argument stressed the fact that the commissioner's
court functioned primarily as a rural government with its significant
tasks being the maintenance of rural roads and rural law enforcement.
Since the apportionment scheme gave the votes of rural citizens much
more weight than their urban counterparts (the only city in the affected
area was entirely within one of four districts), this properly reflected
the rural voter's stake in the decision of the commissioner's court. The
Supreme Court rejected both arguments, saying
We hold . . . that the Constitution permits no substantial variation from equal population in drawing districts for units of local
powers over the entire
government having general governmental
94
geographic area served by the body.
Thus the Court fastened a rather restrictive requirement on local government organization, but at the same time it reaffirmed its decision
in the Sailors and Dusch cases and indicated that there was still some
room for innovation.9"
How much room became highly conjectural after the Court decided
three more one-man, one-vote cases in 1969 and 1970. In Kramer v.
Union Free School District 6 the Court struck down a New York statute
which limited voting for local school board members to parents or
guardians of children enrolled in the school or to the owner or lessee
(or his spouse) of taxable real property within the school district. The
argument was made that these voters had an interest in the outcome of
school board elections substantially greater than other citizens. The
Court agreed that a statute limiting the voting franchise to persons primarily interested or affected by the activities of the elected body might
comply with equal protection requirements, but it found that the classification in the New York act was unreasonable and discriminatory. 91
The Kramer case was shortly followed by Cipriano v. City of Houma9 8
and City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski99 in which the issue was presented
as to whether the voting franchise could be limited to property taxpayers in a municipal bond referendum. Cipriano involved a referendum
on revenue bonds to finance municipal utilities while Phoenix involved
94. Id. at 484-85.
95. Id. at 485.
96. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
97. Id. at 632.
98. 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
99. 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
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the issue of general obligation bonds for an omnibus package of
local improvements. Extending the rationale of Kramer, the Court in
both cases found that property taxpayers had no greater interest and
were no more affected by the passage of these bond issues than other
citizens; therefore, the limitation was unconstitutionally discriminatory.
The high water mark of the one-man, one-vote doctrine at the local level was perhaps achieved in Hadley v. Junior College District,0 0
decided a few months after Ciprianoand before Phoenix. In that case
the Missouri legislature had passed enabling legislation authorizing the
formation of junior college districts. The trustees of the junior college
district-which was geographically made up of several smaller school
districts-were to be elected by voters in each school district according
to a formula that only roughly proportioned votes according to population. The Court held that the junior college district was a local government having general governmental powers within the meaning of the
Avery'"' case, and that there was no justifiable reason for discriminating
10 2
against voters on the basis of subordinate school district boundaries.
Curiously enough, Justice Black in giving the Court's opinion went
out of his way to reaffirm the idea that experimentation and flexibility
at the local government level would be permissible.'0 3 The Court did,
however, expressly reject the "legislative-administrative" distinction
previously advanced in Sailors. 04
The latest chapter to unfold in the story of one-man, one-vote consists of three cases decided by the Supreme Court on June 7, 1971.
One of these cases, Whitcomb v. Chavis,10 5 did not involve an organ of
local government but was a challenge to a multimember district of the
Indiana legislature. The Court held that multimember districts were
not per se unconstitutional under the equal protection clause, and that
the plaintiffs had failed in this case to show that the district in question
operated to discriminate invidiously against any particular racial or political group.
A second case, Abate v. Mundt," 6 involved the validity of a reapportionment plan for Rockland County, New York. Under the plan
township supervisors were elected in each of the five townships in the
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

397 U.S. 50 (1970).
Id. at 53-54; see Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
397 U.S. at 57.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 55-56; see Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105, 110 (1967).
403 U.S. 124 (1971).
Id. at 182 (1971).
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county. These supervisors exercised governmental powers as town officials and also collectively comprised the county legislative body. Since
the townships varied considerably in population, differing numbers of
supervisors would be elected in proportion to each town's population.
Thus, the number of supervisors from each town serving on the county
board varied from one to six. But adherence to the town boundaries
as elective districts for the county government resulted in only a rough
proportionality to population with a maximum deviation between districts of 11.9 percent. It was this deviation which was challenged. The
Supreme Court had already indicated in the case of congressional redistricting that a much smaller percentage of deviation would be unconstitutionally discriminatory.107 However, the Court held the Rockland County plan valid. The opinion stressed the fact that county and
town governments worked closely together and that there could be great
value in having the same officials serve in a dual capacity. Also, the
suggestion was made that the long history of over 100 years of overlapping and dual functions was a factor justifying some departure from
strict population equality.' 08
Finally, Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion in Gordon v.
Lance,' 9 a case in which the West Virginia constitution and statutory
law relating to local government bond issues were challenged. The
provisions in question required a three fifths vote for passage of any
referendum for the issuance of bonds and the imposition of a tax levy.
The referendum in question had received more than 50 percent of the
votes cast, but less than 60 percent. It was argued that the three fifths
requirement discriminated against "yes" voters by giving greater weight
to "no" votes. The Court held, however, that the equal protection
clause prohibited the denial or dilution of an individual's vote because of
some extraneous classification such as wealth, race, or tax status, but
that the class discriminated against must be clearly identifiable-"a
discrete and insular minority"--in order for the clause to apply. The
Court did not regard the "category that favors bonded indebtedness"
as such an identifiable class." 0 Justice Burger went on to say:
Although West Virginia has not denied any group access to the
ballot, it has indeed made it more difficult for some kinds of governmental actions to be taken. Certainly any departure from strict
107.
sible).
108.
109.
110.

Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969) (variance of 5.97% impermis403 U.S. at 186-87.
403 U.S. 1 (1971).
Id. at 5.
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majority rule gives disproportionate power to the minority. But
there is nothing in the language of the Constitution, our history or
our cases that requires that a majority always prevail on every issue.111

The Court went on to point out that many federal and state constitutional provisions, including the amendment process itself, require more
than majority action.' 1 2 By way of dictum the Court also said that state
constitutional provisions requiring more than majority votes or those
requiring a majority of registered voters do not violate the equal protection clause in and of themselves."' However, in a cryptic footnote
the Court added this cautionary language:
We intimate no view on the constitutionality of a provision requiring unanimity or giving a veto power to a very small group. Nor
do we decide whether a state may, consistent with the Constitution,
require4 extraordinary majorities for the election of public officers."

This has been the last pronouncement of the Court to date on the subject.
The 1971 Supreme Court decisions" 15 clearly indicate that the

Court has seen the potential distortion in our "Republican" system of
government which could result from the strictly logical extension of the
numbers game, and it has drawn back. The opinion of Chief Justice
Burger in Gordon v. Lance" 6 is an explicit rejection of the majoritarian
thrust of the equal protection clause in favor of Madisonian checks and
balances. 11 7 The Chief Justice's inability to find an "identifiable class"
discriminated against seems to be a purely verbal argument (and not a
new one)," 8 but the common sense of this 7-2 decision comes through
strongly. A close reading of other recent cases suggests that at least
some of the members of the Court are particularly concerned about the
winner-take-all implications of one-man, one-vote, indicating acceptance of a point of view we have previously referred to as Pluralism."x9
It may therefore be inferred that the Court will not force any extreme
Populistic requirements on the structure of local government to the
exclusion of Madisonian and Pluralistic considerations. In short, it may
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
See text accompanying notes 105-14 supra.
403 U.S. 1 (1971).
See 403 U.S. at 6-7.
See Atchison, T.& S.F.R.R. v. Matthews, 174 U.S.96 (1899).
E.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 141-42 (1971).
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be said that the Court has its own concept of a "Republican Form of
Government" which would appear to reflect traditional thinking.
But it is clear, especially in view of Justice Brennan's explicit opinion in Baker v. Carr,1 20 that the Court is not ready to impose any "republican" requirements on local government by holding the guaranty
clause justiciable. Likewise, it is not probable that the Court will soon
attempt to use a standard of "reasonableness" under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to measure the legitimacy of local
government, although there are conflicting precedents which could be
rationalized to support that position. 121 One must return to traditional
notions of administrative law (channeling discretion) 1 22 and municipal
law (the miniature republic) 1 23 to find any positive requirements for
structuring subordinate governments. In short, the one-man, one-vote
decisions of the Supreme Court have not affirmatively dictated any particular means of constituting subordinate government.
Having ascertained what the Court has not done, we should briefly
consider what the Court might have done. Professor Dixon has strongly
criticized the Court for relying on the equal protection clause rather
than relying upon the guaranty clause or due process:
The republican guarantee clause would dictate a constitutional litigation focus encompassing necessarily a concern for representation
results. The due process clause through its stress on ground rules
of substantial reasonableness would yield the same breadth of focus.
By contrast, grounding apportionment litigation on the equal protection clause tended to lead to a near-exclusive focus not on representation results and not on consideration of equal treatment of
voter plaintiffs, but rather on concern simply for equality in the
total population masses encompassed in legislative districts-a con1 24
cern in short for physical form and not for political substance.
Using the guaranty clause the Court might have dictated a new framework of legitimacy for subordinate government, perhaps emphasizing
Pluralism and the desirability of providing a forum for minority and
dissident views. Certainly use of the guaranty clause would provide
much more flexibility in imposing standards of fairness than the strictly
Populistic thrust of the equal protection clause. 125 The threadbare
thinking which has centered around the idea of illegal delegation of
120.
121.
29, at
122.
123.
124.
125.

369
See
135.
See
See

U.S. 186, 217-29 (1962).
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954);

text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
text accompanying notes 51-58 supra.
DIXON, supra note 29, at 136.
See text accompanying notes 115-19 supra.
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power might have been replaced by more enlightened theory based upon
more scientific and realistic studies of government. Such new doctrine
would have been achieved at a price, however. The prestige and effectiveness of the Court might have been seriously impaired by such a foray
into applied political science. The judicial forum is not suited for every
kind of policy making, and judicial remedies are far from completely
effectual as the slow and agonizing implementation of the Court's school
desegregation decisions now reveals. This is the fear originally ex1 26
pressed in Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Baker v. Carr
and reiterated by Justice Harlan in his many dissenting opinions in the
12 7
one-man, one-vote cases.
What, then, has the court demanded in the structuring of subordinate governments? As already suggested, the requirement is a negative
one. To generalize, one can say that where an election of public officials is undertaken, a voter may not be discriminated against so that
his vote counts less than any other, whether such discrimination is accomplished by unequal districting, irrational limitation of the electorate,
or any other electoral scheme. This is a limited and narrow requirement, aimed not at insuring adequate representation, but only at preventing one kind of abuse of democratic process.
The Application of One-Man, One-Vote to
Metropolitan or Regional Government
Considering the more obvious ways in which the policy-making
body or bodies in regional or metropolitan governments might be constituted, direct election, the traditional practice in city government, suggests itself first. Current constitutional doctrine approves the election
of representatives-at-large, from single member districts, or from multimember districts as long as there is no dilution of "the voting strength of
racial or political elements." 2 " Under Whitcomb v. Chavi 1 2 9 the gerrymandering of districts, especially on a racial basis, is nominally justiciable, but the complaining party has a heavy burden of proof to show
that he is a member of a class which in fact has been invidiously discriminated against. Election of a regional legislative body from dis126. 369 U.S. 186, 297-324 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
127. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589-629 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
See also Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 165-70 (1971) (separate opinion); Oregon
v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 152-219 (1970) (separate opinion).
128. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 144 (1971).
129. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
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tricts formed by older governmental units (e.g., cities, towns) of differing populations seems out of the question.'
Proportional Representation
A more difficult problem is presented by elections based upon a
scheme of proportional representation. Proportional representation is
used here broadly and loosely to mean any electoral system which contains a built-in device for preserving minority representation. Thus,
even under one-man, one-vote in the standard election process a party
winning 60 per cent of the votes may win anywhere from 100 per cent
of the legislative seats down to less than half. A system of proportional
representation would operate to bring the number of seats won more
closely in line with the overall vote. The simplest method of preserving minority representation is to increase the number of legislators and
districts. Thus, in an at-large (one district) election with two parties
presenting full slates of candidates, the winning party takes all seats regardless of the victory margin. Theoretically, the same result could occur if there were one hundred legislators elected from one hundred districts; however, this would require uniform distribution of voters by party
and would be extremely unlikely as a practical matter. Since this
method of achieving proportional representation is not a departure from
the standard electoral scheme discussed in the preceding paragraph,
there is no constitutional objection to it.
Two other methods of achieving proportional representation
through the elective process are known as weighted voting and fractional voting.' 3 ' Since these systems raise serious problems with respect
to the internal operations of the legislative body, they have not been
1 32
favored, and are not likely to be suggested for regional government.
More important are two other types of electoral machinery which
have been found to be effective in preserving minority representationlimited voting and cumulative voting. Under limited voting the voter is
130. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
131. Weighted voting and fractional voting plans retain some unequal population
districts for the primary purpose of ensuring a voice in the legislature for the smaller
political entities. In pure weighted voting each district has one legislator, who is

allocated a number of votes in proportion to the unequal population of the represented
district. In a fractional voting system, no legislator has more than one vote. Legislators elected from underpopulated districts are assigned a fractional vote. Thus, if the
unit's population is half of the state quota for a full seat, the legislator receives a half
vote. DIXON, supra note 29, at 516.
132. Id. at 516-20.
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allowed to vote for fewer than the number of position to be filled. Thus,
if ten seats are up for election, he may be allowed to vote for only eight
or seven so that the minority party or parties may pick up two or three of
the ten seats. The actual result will depend upon how many parties
field candidates, how many each party runs, and what percentage of
the vote each candidate recieves. The defect in this system, if it can be
called that, is the opposite of the winner-take-all defect in ordinary atlarge or multimember district elections, i.e., a minority group may possibly be over-represented (although it cannot achieve a majority of
representatives) rather than not represented at all. In an election with
only two parties this is extremely unlikely; under limited voting the results in numbers of representatives are more likely to approximate voting
percentages than in an ordinary at-large election.
Similar in effect to limited voting is cumulative voting. Each
voter within a multimember district is allowed to divide his votes among
different candidates or to cumulate them as he sees fit. Thus, in a three
member district the voter may give all three votes to one candidate by
voting for only one, or he may vote for two candidates, giving each
1% votes, or he may give one vote to each of three candidates. If
a minority party plans its strategy properly, it may receive seats which
it otherwise would lose to the majority. Again, the percentage of representatives in the legislative body from each party seems more likely to
approximate actual voting percentages than without the cumulative device.
More elaborate systems of proportional representation, including
the classic "Hare" system,1 33 have been devised and occasionally employed. These are all designed around the same principle inherent in
limited voting and cumulative voting, i.e., the minimizing of "lost" votes
133. Under the Hare system a voter is given a single transferable vote. He indicates his preference among candidates by ranking them in his order of preference.
Any candidate who receives more than a certain number of votes will have those votes
redistributed according to the voter's other choices. Ultimately, therefore, each win.
ning candidate receives the same number of votes. The maximum number of votes
any candidate is able to retain is determined by the following formula:
+ 1 = Single Seat
Votes cast
Quota
Number of seats to be filled + 1
For instance, assume an election in which 100,000 votes are cast to elect nine
legislators. The quota for each candidate is, therefore, 10,001 votes. Surplus ballots
(above the quota) of winning candidates and the ballots of bottom candidates are
redistributed to second, third, or lower choices. At the end of the redistribution
process nine candidates will have received 10,001 votes and 9,911 votes will be "lost."
This is in contrast to a possible "loss" of more than 49,000 votes in a single-member
district plurality system. Id. at 525-26.
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so that any party or bloc will be able to elect representatives in proportion to its voting strength in the electorate.'
Presumably any of these electoral schemes might be proposed for
a regional or metropolitan government. Certainly they provide workable machinery to implement the values in Pluralism and Madison's republican principle, and they do not run afoul of the one-man, one-vote
constitutional requirement. As pointed out, one-man, one-vote is not
aimed at representation results (much less does it guarantee winnertake-all), but at dilution of the vote. A citizen is certainly no more deprived of his vote or has his vote diluted under a system of proportional
representation than the person who votes for a losing candidate in a
standard election. If it is not "a denial of equal protection to deny legislative seats to losing candidates ,' 135 it cannot be a denial of equal protection to award seats according to the actual vote. The only possible
objection to proportional representation as such is the theoretical possibility of overrepresenting a minority party, i.e., that the system is not
proportional enough. Although this is not a practical danger, even if
it occurred the group discriminated against would be the majority-not
in itself an "identifiable class" under Gordon v. Lance.136
Appointment
There are other means of selecting the governing body of a regional or metropolitan government. Direct appointment of a "regional
administrator" or "board of commissioners" by some public official,
presumably the governor or the president, is a possibility. 1 37 It is an
especially popular method if the regional government is subordinate
to the federal, rather than to a state government, since there is no tradition of elected subordinate governments within the federal structure
itself. That the United States has been moving rapidly toward direct
federal-local governmental relations since the 1930's is a well known
phenomenon, and the overlapping, duplication and inconsistency in pol134. Id. at 525-27.
135. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971).
136. 402 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1971).
137. There is precedent for such a proposal in the state park and state hospital
administrators commonly appointed by the governors in many states, e.g., CAL. PUB.
REs. CODE § 501 (West Supp. 1971) (director of department of parks); CAL. WELF. &

§ 4005 (West Supp. 1971) (director of department of mental hygiene),
and the administrators appointed by the president in such federal agencies as the
Veterans' Administration, 38 U.S.C. § 210 (1970), and the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, 42 U.S.C. § 3533 (1970).
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icy between various federal aid programs has become notorious.' 38 Recent proposals for revenue sharing, 1 39 if adopted, would tend to reverse
this process; however, it remains a real possibility that regional planning, economic resource allocation, and other functions may eventually
be taken over by consolidated regional federal agencies. Much in the
way of policy is already dictated by Uncle Sam. This is not to say, of
course, that there is any serious difficulty in political theory or constitutional doctrine which would prevent the formation of an elected government subordinate to Congress. In fact some federal programs presently come close to this by requiring the program to be administered in
part by "representatives" of the people affected. 40 Either way, the
Fourteenth Amendment is only applicable to the states by its express
terms, therefore constitutional limitations on the delegation of power
power to such subordinate governments would be found primarily in
the Fifth Amendment due process clause and would operate along lines
familiar in the field of administrative law.
The appointment of the regional or metropolitan government by
the governor is a much more likely alternative. The state itself does
have an important interest in regional or metropolitan policy and particularly in the interrelationships and coordination (or lack of it) between various subordinate governments in a metropolitan area. This
becomes especially important in a two-tiered system in which smaller
governments are permitted to exist (or are newly created) with attenuated powers under the thumb of a county, metro, or regional government.' 4 ' The argument here is that the smaller governments serve the
function of a sociopolitical community in which democratic values can
actually be achieved while the higher government makes those decisions and runs those programs appropriate for area-wide treatment. If
the higher government is appointed, it will have to stand constitutional
muster as a legal delegation of legislative power, an area in which state
standards have been at least superficially higher than federal, but nevertheless easy enough to meet.' 4 ' The equal protection clause would
138.
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have no applicability because of its narrow focus on the discriminatory
exercise of power. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could conceivably be made applicable, but as previously discussed
the court has expressly rejected that approach and does not appear inclined to change its position.1" 3 Therefore, it may be concluded that
there is no federal constitutional bar to such appointment.
A somewhat more difficult problem is presented if the appointment discussed above is required to be made according to a particular
formula. A hypothetical example would be a provision which requires
the governor to appoint five board members, two of whom must reside
in the largest city in the metropolitan area and three of whom must reside outside the city but within each of three counties contained in
the metropolitan area. The inference here is that a pluralistic representation is sought to be achieved. In view of the Dusch case,'4 4
such residence requirements would be upheld even if the board members were elected at large; a fortiori their appointment would present
no problem. Other formulas, however, might be challenged. One
possibility would be where the appointed board of five is required to
be selected on the basis of two from outside the metropolitan area and
three from among the elected officials (e.g., mayors) of cities within
the metropolitan area. The argument can be made that since at least
three of the board members hold their positions by virtue of election
from their own constituencies, and these constituencies are presumably
unequal in population, some voters are underrepresented. This argument fails for two reasons. First, the board members do not hold their
positions by virtue of their election to the office of mayor, although that
is a prerequisite, but by virtue of their appointment by the governor.
Secondly, and more importantly, the thrust of one-man, one-vote is not
directed at representation results,4 5 but at discrimination against voters-no vote, no discrimination. The same representation result
could be obtained by a governor under the free appointment system
discussed in the preceding paragraph, and no equal protection clause
argument could be sustained.
The foregoing hypothetical should be distinguished from the situation in which the governor is required to appoint the mayors of the five
largest cities (or all of the cities) to constitute the regional board. Such
a method is not an appointment at all since no discretion is left to the
143.
144.
145.

See text accompanying notes 115-19 supra.
Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967).
See text accompanying note 116 supra.
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governor but is tantamount to election from unequal districts. Even
dual officeholding could not constitutionally save such a scheme under
Abate v. Mundt. 4 '
This leads us to one of the most perplexing problems to be faced
under one-man, one-vote. 47 Suppose that a regional government is
composed of delegates sent by local units within the region (cities,
counties, etc.) as is now done with many councils of governments. 48
The assumption is made, of course, that the delegate from each local
unit is "appointed" by the governing body or executive officer of that
unit and is not popularly elected. Would such a system be characterized as appointive or elective? If the latter, it obviously fails to meet
the one-man, one-vote requirement as the preceding discussion indicates. If the former, one-man, one-vote should have no applicability.
However, we may be assured that the Supreme Court will look at the
substance of the scheme, not the form. Therefore, the question really
is: Do the delegates represent the people in their local units, or do
they represent the local unit as a political organization?
Most, if not all, councils of government (COG) today have no real
governmental power inasmuch as their policy decisions are implemented
through the existing machinery at the local level. Hence the COG council is really representative of the local units, a true confederation rather
than a superior government. But if, as has been proposed and as seems
likely,"4 9 the COGs are gradually given important powers, they will become governments of the people in a minature federal system. The
conclusion then is that such a system of selecting the regional council
will become invalid under one-man, one-vote at some point when it
ceases to operate primarily for and through local units of government
and begins to operate directly for and upon the people of the region.
Conclusion
In general one may conclude that the one-man, one-vote decisions
of the Supreme Court place only a rather narrow limitation on the structuring of subordinate governments. The new applicability of the Four146. 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
147. For a pre-Abate and Whitcomb analysis of the impact of the one-man, onevote doctrine on the movement for structural reform of local government see Dixon,
Rebuilding the Urban Political System: Some Heresies Concerning Citizen Participation, Community Action, Metros, and One Man-One Vote, 58 GEo. LI. 955 (1970).
148.

See Comus, The Council of Governments Approach to Governmental Frag-

mentation, 22 V qD. L. REv. 811, 815-16 (1969).
149. Id. at 832.
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teenth Amendment equal protection clause does not require any particular method of selection of the governing body and does not even necessitate a "republican" form of metropolitan or regional government.
The Court has, perhaps wisely, refrained from imposing stringently Populistic requirements in a complex political situation. Apparently, the
Court, as it has said all along, will allow room for innovation and variation. Most of the types of governmental organization which have been
proposed and discussed above in this article do not violate the federal
constitution. The one pole-star to which the court had demanded obeisance is that when local officials are elected through the democratic process, the electoral scheme employed must not discriminate against any
person so as to dilute his voting power.

